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ONE PHILOSOPHY FOR AN AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
Paul K. Conkin*
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. By Morton
White. New York: Oxford University Press. 1978. Pp. xii, 299.
$15.95.

The title of this book is misleading. Morton White realizes
that no single body of beliefs, be they philosophical or not, informed the thousands of individual choices that made possible a
successful war for American independence, a war that only exemplifies some of the many definitions of a revolution. We do not
even have conclusive evidence of any fully common beliefs among
the quite diverse and quite large body of colonial leaders. In any
case, this is not what White seeks. Instead, he takes the Preamble
of the Declaration of Independence as his departing point and
explores some possible epistemological assumptions reflected in
the "self-evident" claim and some possible theological and metaphysical assumptions behind the doctrine of unalienable rights.
The key person, as almost always in such exploration, is Thomas
Jefferson, the original author of the Declaration. Throughout,
White intimates that Jefferson represented a rather broad consensus in moral philosophy, but White rarely makes this claim in
a precise and explicit way, and he vindicates it by only a few
appeals to the expressed beliefs of John Adams, James Wilson,
and Alexander Hamilton.
White's purpose is neither carefully to verify descriptions of
what Jefferson believed, nor rigorously to explore how he came to
hold certain beliefs. We get little personal biography. White
seems content to establish by biographical evidence that Jefferson was in a position to hold certain views. White draws his major
inferences about philosophical positions from texts, from the actual words of the Declaration of Independence, and from other
roughly contemporaneous statements by Jefferson or by his contemporaries. Once he infers a lurking but unanalyzed belief
among such Americans, he turns to major and much more explicit
European intellectuals to explore its fullest implication. Thus,
the several analytical essays that largely make up the book var* Professor of History, University of Wisconsin. B.A. 1951, Milligan College; M.A.
1953, Ph.D. 1957, Vanderbilt University.-Ed.
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iously engage the meaning and implication of doctrines originated or developed not by Americans, but by such European
mentors as Locke, Hutcheson, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui.
White occasionally sees a direct lineage, as from Burlamaqui to
Jefferson, but he rarely develops the evidence for such direct
links.
This strategy largely finesses the all but unanswerable historical issues. Precisely what philosophical position did Jefferson
really intend by his loftier moral statements? White does a lot of
challengeable mind reading and often outfits an impressionable,
elusive, and conventional Jefferson in some surprisingly logical
and sophisticated philosophical dress. The probabilities in this
game are always so low that other historians can suggest quite
different but equally persuasive alternatives. More often than
not, I suspect Jefferson had not thought through the subtler implications of his language and that his words retained some measure of ambiguity. I find it hard to argue, as White often does,
that major philosophical alternatives rose and fell with shifts of
a single word in the Declaration, or that Jefferson or anyone else
really perceived the subtler issues that now seem at stake. I am
also confident that Jefferson borrowed much of the very elliptical
wording of the Declaration from the earlier, less eloquent, but
more explicit and precise Virginia Declaration of Rights, and that
quite possibly he never struggled intellectually with many of the
word choices that now seem so significant to White. Throughout
this book, White all but ignores the American context, not only
the practical urgencies but even the extensive American pamphlet literature that preceded the Declaration. I suspect his leap
to Europe, and to major and reasonably systematic philosophers,
oversimplified his task.
. Such doubts challenge the historical credentials of such an
abstract analytical excursion, not its usefulness. Whether Jefferson followed Hutcheson or Burlamaqui in his understanding of
natural law, or, more probably, made a typically eclectic use of
both, the two points of view existed as intellectual options. Both
provided Jefferson, had he so desired, philosophical tools for filling in all the ellipses of his Declaration or for fleshing out the
exact meaning of his eloquent but often elusive language. They
provide us such an opportunity today. I prefer to read White's
book as an exploration of the possible meanings present in the
original Declaration, or even those meanings that we may ascribe
to such a living document today. For he is not concerned only
with a description of eighteenth-century options, but offers his
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evaluation of the present philosophical credentials of such doctrines. Present concerns, and personal preferences, clearly and
correctly guided White in his selection of issues worth detailed
exploration, as well as in his evaluation of their logical or epistemological credentials. In a few places, I suspect, present concerns
also precluded his understanding past options. It is these lapses
from historical accuracy that deserve extended exploration in this
Review.
In the first half of his book, White explores the "self-evident"
claim. He believes that Jefferson, like most American moral
theorists, adhered to some version of what he calls rationalistic
intuitionism. To such theorists, certain moral obligations seemed
as undoubtable and unchallengeable as Euclidian axioms. White
uses Locke's Essay to exemplify a very sophisticated version of
this theory. He is balanced and fair in his reading of Locke. He
also clarifies some of the problems in any form of intuitionist
claim. Intuitive principles are not innate, but in some sense
learned, grasped, or inferred. Moral understanding requires
thought and judgment. Yet, all who think carefully about certain
moral issues will reach similar conclusions-for example, all will
agree that one cannot make murder a rule of conduct. But this is
no sooner said than it must be qualified. One who values life will
not be able, consistently, to urge murder as a rule, as Kant
pointed out. Given a universal commitment to the preservation
and enhancement of human life, any condoning of murder is obviously impermissible because it threatens such goals. But this
seems to push back the problem. Is it self-evident that we should
always value life? Surely not. Thus, moral claims, which usually
relate to matters of fact but are not themselves cognitive statements, always seem to beg issues of personal identity, of developed sentiments and preferences, of how one experiences things.
White works out all these implications clearly. He also argues
persuasively what I think is too obvious to justify his labor-that
none of our major founding fathers were utilitarians. Of course,
they often appealed to utility and believed that their moral axioms would indeed conduce to greater happiness for greater numbers. But they were unwilling to rest their appeal to principle on
any interaction of developed commitments and matters of fact.
They were afraid of any teleology that was only human and contextual. They wanted, somehow, to justify what ought to be by
what eternally is. They appealed either to an essential human
nature or to a creator and his purposes for man. Again, White
carefully and at times brilliantly establishes what has long
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seemed all but obvious-that in moral theory men like Jefferson
still adhered to a cosmic teleology rooted either in Christian theology or Aristotelian science. This distresses White, for all such
supports for self-evident principles subvert the epistemological
claim or fall into a vicious circularity. The so-called self-evident
principles turn out to be only logical inferences from an ontological position that itself begs grounds for beliefs. For example,
without conclusive evidence for the existence of a purposeful creator and sustainer of our universe, and without evidenced knowledge of his (or its) goals, the self-evident claim becomes only a
sophistic camouflage of self-affirmation.
This line of analysis leads White to the most distorting and
diverting thesis of his book-that the Declaration was not a
"democratic" document. He here creates an amazing strawman-that in some sense the Declaration of Independence either
contained, or was widely believed to contain, a "democratic"
justification for revolution. He has no basis for such an assumption except a few off-handed statements to the effect that Jefferson has gained a reputation as a democrat. If anything is clear,
it is that the Declaration was not an appeal to any consensus, but
to enlightened opinion and, beyond that, to the objective moral
authority of a god and his creation. In the political sense, such
an authoritarian appeal seems the very antithesis of democratic.
Of course, the word "democratic" is impossibly loaded. White
knows this and clarifies his rather unusual meaning-by
"democratic" he here refers to the political implications of various moral theories. A "democratic" moral· argument would be
one that the people..:....literally everyone-understand and respond to. Thus, if self-evident principles are "democratic," they
must not involve esoteric or technical knowledge and must not be
the property of a moral elite. By this criterion, the self-evident
claim in the Declaration, and its supporting ontology, cannot
qualify as "democratic." The insights are too subtle, the supporting arguments too refined for the untutored to understand, as
anyone can testify who has struggled with all the intricacies of
natural law theory. This seems to White either deplorable, disappointing, or at least contrary to conventional assumptions. Since
Locke indicted the elitist and arbitrary political potential of appeals to innate ideas, White feels justified in proving, as did
Hobbes, that intuitively self-evident axioms almost equally lend
themselves to elitist abuse, to a Gnostic-like moral dictatorship
of priests, judges, or philosophers who alone claim fullest access
to what is true or to what is beautiful.
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Such purported elitist implications are, of course, present in
the Declaration. But they are present in any moral discourse.
White builds a vast argument around a vacuous comparison. His
point would repay beating through three chapters only if one
could identify any moral theory that' was "democratic" in his
perverse sense of the word. White never identifies any truly democratic moral theory, for some conditions-of intellectual effort, of
accepted logical conventions, of knowledge of context, of honesty
in matters of taste-qualify any conceivable moral theory. Moral
discourse always departs from a felt apprehension that some people either misbehave or misunderstand what is good in the way
of behavior. A world in which everyone was morally perfect, or
even perfectly understood their moral obligations, would have no
need for moral philosophy. The very game itself has a built-in
qualification-that people need to attend to their behavior or to
their thinking about behavior. Thus, in the natural law tradition,
one had to appeal, not to the diverse perceptions and understandings of everyman, -but to right reason, to people who· are concerned, to those who will think carefully on moral issues. No one
is born a moral philosopher any more than one is born well versed
in Euclidian axioms. But, so the theory went, anyone with ordinary human intelligence can come to understand either and to
recognize their undoubted validity. If this is elitism, so be it.
Even utilitarian theory, which seems more congenial to White,
requires an active and often very demanding attention to matters
of sentiment and of fact. Morality is never something spontaneous. The only "democratic" claim in any moral theory is always one of possibility-anyone can understand.
This political perspective guides White's analysis of the
Scottish moral-sense view so often identified with Jefferson.
White presents such a theory as an alternative to rationalistic
intuitionism, and in the late eighteenth century it often seemed
so. White thus argues, as against the recent claims of Garry Wills,
that a youthful Jefferson adhered to the intuitionist view and only
later embraced the moral-sense position. Given such disjunctive
options, I agree with White. On textual grounds, the wording in
the Declaration supports an intuitionist view and with it the restrictive, juristic meaning that White finds in the concept of
human equality, and not the more radical sense of equal abilities
that Wills reads into it. Jefferson later insisted that an overly
intellectualized understanding of morality was false to the
facts-simple people are often not only the most moral (this
might be because of habit) but also exemplify refined moral sensi-
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bility in their judgments of other people. This makes the idea of
a moral faculty appear a nonintellectual alternative to natural
law, even if the moral content ends up being identical, and also
rests- morality on a theoretical viewpoint which seems more consistent with an equalitarian political order. But as White makes
clear, Jefferson recognized that the moral faculty has to grow and
develop. In a less intellectualized context, this still suggests a
moral elite made up of all those with a healthy, mature moral
sense. Jefferson only shifted his criteria from intellectual standards to esthetic norms, from logical acuity to a cultivated moral
sensibility. Such a shift might, indeed, suggest that we should
seek out the moral aristocrats of a society among simple plowmen
and not learned schoolmen.
I distrust this reading of Jefferson's shifting commitments. It
depends too much on the analysis of a few texts and again assumes too much in the way of philosophical self-consciousness.
Intuitionist and moral-sense appeals interpenetrate too much to
vindicate the argument that there was a major shift in Jefferson's
moral theory, although no doubt he found the Scottish view increasingly congenial. But the moral-sense position is not necessarily inconsistent with more intuitive or intellectualist views.
Much more than White suggests, the two emphases can complement each other. Scottish philosophers, such as Francis Hutcheson, joined Jonathan Edwards in offering anesthetic conception
of virtue. Virtuous acts are beautiful, and those who observe them
rush to praise because of intrinsic qualities in the acts and not
because of contemplated outcomes or reference to some carefully
thought-out moral theory. People have a mental faculty that recognizes and endorses certain actions. Note that such a theory
relates directly to human action, or to complaisance toward such
action. One does not need to have the guidance of self-evident
axioms to be kind or generous or to celebrate such qualities in
others.
Such a focus upon the act, and upon a very primitive type
of moral taste or sensibility, does not preclude very useful thinking about one's behavior. Experience itself, or certain qualities
present in experience, bring one into a moral universe, but an
esthetic response is nevertheless an inadequate tool of moral
judgment or criticism. The moral sense can be generous but still
blind to long-term consequences. Thus, such anesthetic foundation is not inconsistent with hard intellectual work or with ethical
systems that merge sensibility and intellect. Insofar as people
such as Jefferson believed in self-evident moral axioms, albeit
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axioms learned through intellectual effort, they could see these as
indispensable critical tools. In fact, few moralists are ever able to
remain at either pole or extreme-at only sensibility or only intellectual guidelines. Hutcheson did not. In the context of act and
character, taste predominates; in the area of rule-making, intellect dominates. It is not surprising that Jefferson, as determined
a moralist as we have had in American history, easily moved back
and forth between both theories, variously stressing whichever
seemed most consistent with practical contexts or argumentative
purposes.
In the second half of his book, White explores the meaning,
and the ontological foundations, of unalienable rights. He skirts
the classical and medieval development of natural law theory and
touches on only a few of its modem developments. Again, he is
attuned to a few texts, not to broader continuities. He proves, and
I suspect no one doubts, that even Jefferson's conception of natural law depended upon a belief in a creative and benevolent deity
and upon his purposes for man. To White, a natural law expresses
a duty or obligation consistent with man's essence and God's will.
A natural right is a power or leeway to act consistently with one's
God-given nature. Such rights are unalienable, not in the sense
that they cannot be taken away from a person, but in the sense
that one cannot give them up or transfer them without violating
moral law. Such a near-governmental meaning of right did gain
some credence in the eighteenth century, but White drastically
oversimplifies the issues by suggesting that any one meaning ever
prevailed, even in the thought of Jefferson. The word "right"
remained loaded, full of ambiguities. Contrary to White's arguments, a much more traditional meaning, one tied more to identity or status than to behavioral leeway or to power, remained
persuasive in the eighteenth century. A right, in this sense, is a
possessive moral claim, a part of rather than a function of the
essence of man. Such a right is the opposite of a wrong and is
literally unalienable-no matter what a person does, or what others do to him, he retains a right to his life and his liberty. Even
as a slave, he still possesses the right of liberty.
Given his functional orientation to rights, it is not surprising
that White attends most carefully to life and to happiness. In
doing so, he slights liberty and completely distorts all the historical issues tied to the word "property." Like so many other recent
historians, White sees the three unalienable rights of the Declaration as parallel, which suggests that "pursuit of happiness" was
Jefferson's chosen substitute for property. This seems the most
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obvious reading, but it faces enormous problems. Traditionally,
the three rights of life, liberty, and property always came first,
to be followed by happiness as a more summative or encompassing term. Most American states followed this pattern in their
declarations of right. In doing so, they adhered to traditional
state-of-nature conventions, in which the protection or preservation of these three fully interactive and inseparable rights-life,
liberty, and property-was the minimal necessity for human happiness and thus the minimal and justifying moral end of any
government. The emphasis upon happiness goes back at least to
early Calvinist political theory, when this term began to gain
equal status with justice or security. The emphasis upon happiness did not, as White suggests, derive from a new, more benevolent eighteenth-century conception of a deity who not only created man to be happy, but even made the pursuit of happiness
an obligation. Given the developed tradition, I believe the best
guess is that Jefferson, probably for literary reasons, reduced the
normal trinity of rights to only two-life and liberty-but kept
happiness as a summative term. This makes sense if one reads
the abbreviated statement in the Declaration as an exceedingly
elliptical version of the earlier Virginia Declaration of Rights,
which spelled out in quite explicit detail the traditional rights of
man: "the enjoyment oflife and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."
What about property? No contemporary historian seems
willing to deal honestly with the issues here. Present :meanings
seem always to intrude. The word "property" is a bundle of ambiguities. By the time of the French Revolution Jefferson came to
realize this, a realization that gives some credence to the argument that he deliberately left the word out of the Declaration.
The problem is one of meaning, not of words. In natural law
theory, the word "property" gained full equality with life and
liberty only at the time of the Reformation. But for any careful
moral theorist, including Locke, only certain types of property
deserved such a st~tus. If one is to preserve his life, he must eat.
If he is to be at liberty, independent of the control of other men,
he must have access to natural goods or to productive resources
and also must be able to keep the products of his own labor. If
"property" means such access and such control, then it is inseparable from life and liberty. Such access and such control does
not require private ownership; communal property may equally
well meet the moral imperative. Thus, "property" in its broadest
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meaning may be a natural and unalienable right totally apart
from any conventions that undergird private property. Given the
early Christian experiment in communism and the continued
communalism of several monasteries, Christian theorists up
through Aquinas stopped short of making even strictly qualified
private ownership a natural and unalienable right. In the sense
that White uses the term, Aquinas did make private property an
adventitious right, although one quite essential in the social context of European nations. But the legal form that such private
property always takes is, to some extent, conventional, a matter
of political choice and not of man's essence or God's will.
Protestant theorists raised private property to the level of a
natural and unalienable right. In order to do so they had to circumscribe such private ownership by all manner of qualifications,
such as need and responsible use. Even more critical, they had
to support it by arguments in behalf of natural plenty. Even
Locke denied any natural right to monopoly property and forbade
enclosure if land of equal fertility was not still in the commons
and thus available for other people. By the time of Jefferson, most
of the earlier moral content in the concept of natural property
could already best be translated as "economic opportunity." The
states, in stressing the right to acquire, still gave some lip service
to earlier meanings. But in such a positive sense American governments did not live up to the implications of natural property.
Instead, in their positive laws concerning private possessions, the
states certified all but unlimited accumulation, endorsed growing
rents, and thus permitted the exclusion of more and more people
from ownership. This led, by 1829, to the agrarian claims of
Thomas Skidmore and others that Jefferson had betrayed the
American people by his flaccid euphemism, "pursuit of happiness." This euphemism allowed our governments to renege on
their highest obligation-to assure everyone their right to property, that is, their right to obtain their equal share of what God
had given to all mankind.
White addresses none of these subtleties. In fact, he seems
totally oblivious to even the ambiguities in the word property and
characteristically uses a gold watch as an example of private
property. Since it is not immoral to give away (to alienate) such
a gold watch, then property cannot be an unalienable right. Of
course, one gives away a watch, not necessarily one's moral claim
to it, for such a claim is implicit in giving as much as in selling.
And if we substitute for the watch food necessary for the survival
of one's family, or the productive resources necessary for one to
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earn a living, one can see quite easily how one cannot morally
justify giving away property. It would then be an unalienable
right even in White's peculiarly functional sense of right. By superficial arguments about watches, White reveals his own restrictive, commodity-like use of the word "property." Thus, as is characteristic of contemporary American intellectuals, he so conceives of property as to make it, not an essential aspect of one's
personality, of one's chance for happiness and fulfillment, but a
potential obstacle to such happiness. Here we obviously flounder
in a tyranny of words, and White is not the first to wade all but
blindly into such a semantic jungle. After all, either hypocritical
or morally insensitive Americans soon appealed to a right of property even in defense of slavery.
I must emphasize that White's problem here is, strangely
enough, a failure to be analytical. He surrenders his philosophical
credentials. Behind the verbal confusion, he clearly favors a very
positive government obligation in the economic area, or something close to the root meanings of property in the natural law
tradition. White finds momentous implications in a shift, apparently approved by Jefferson, from an original draft of the Declaration which made it the duty of government "to secure these
ends"-life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness-to an obligation in
the final draft "to secure these rights." To White, ends entail a
positive role for government, one not only of protecting rights (a
negative duty), but of doing what is needed to help people secure
such goals. I suspect he reads too much into such a word shift and
sets up an impossible disjunction between negative and positive
guarantees. He even sees here evidence of a deep ambivalence in
Jefferson, who is at one point a libertarian fearful of other than
limited government, at another a person quite willing to use government as a tool to help people become happy. Thus, White
believes Jefferson, at his best, was really an early advocate of a
welfare state. I suspect that all such arguments are viciously
presentist.
White's distinctive, often highly private reading of natural
rights theory brings him back at the end of the book to the same
sermon he preached against self-evident truths. Natural law and
natural right theories can also subvert the possibilities of
"democracy." Here, "democracy" does not so much denote a consensus on moral theory as full political participation. Even
though Jefferson left property out of the Declaration, almost
every other American leader embraced ill-defined property rights
and clothed them all with the sanctity of natural law. For exam-
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pie, in the Revolutionary era those leaders continued older franchise rules; they joined property qualifications with sexual and
racial criteria to deny citizenship to a majority of Americans.
They argued that one without property was dependent, unable to
function as an agent and thus as a responsible citizen. Once
again, moral dictators had their way, and even persuaded simple
people to go along. White does not take such an association of
property with citi?enship seriously enough to analyze its meaning
or to consider its logical and factual justification. He simply sees
such a flagrant and undemocratic abuse of a doctrine as a perfect
illustration of his central claim-that any intuitive moral claim
or any appeal to the essence of man or to the will of a creator is a
potentially dangerous weapon of an arrogant elite. It is hard for
me to conceive of any moral theory not subject to such abuse, but
it does seem incumbent upon White, if he is to use this as an
example of abuse, to clarify exactly why it is so. After all, I had
always supposed, with Skidmore and to a certain extent even
with John Adams, that the tie between voting and property made
good sense and that the moral implication of such a relationship
was not so much disfranchisement as government policies adequate to provide everyone a realistic opportunity of owning property.
I have emphasized the weaknesses of White's book, not its
strengths. I applaud much that he attempts. He is concerned,
except for the one case of property, to penetrate the veil of words
and to find the various concepts that lay behind them. Once
launched on an analytical excursion, White is meticulously logical in his inferences. But I still find his book surprisingly unenlightening. Over half of it involves analytical clarifications of
what has long been obvious to historians. So many of White's
strawmen would embarrass a recent high school text. And by
narrowing his analytical focus, by working with a few texts or a
few key statements, White often moves into an abstract limbo far
removed from any specific historical context. Why, for example,
does he work with a few phrases in the Declaration of Independence and all but ignore the numerous and much more explicit
state declarations of rights? Finally, even though equipped with
the needed analytical tools, White is not a sensitive moral theorist. He moves awkwardly through the subject matter of traditional moral philosophy. Consequently, he is blind to most subtleties and nuances. This may be because he is not sympathetic
enough to Christian theology and natural law theory to present
them at their best, however persuasive his reading of detached
bits and pieces.

